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FORUM

A SAFER SKY: AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS AFFECTING FLIGHT SAFETY IN TAIWAN
Ping I Lee

INTRODUCTION
On April 26,1994, China Airlines (CAL) Flight 140, service from Taipei, Taiwan to Nagoya, Japan, crashed near
Nagoya International Airport while attempting an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 34. The fully
loaded Airbus 300-622R stalled at an altitude of approximately 1,500 feet which resulted in a fiery crash that killed
all 264 onboard (Sogame, Ladkin). This tragedy was not the first fatal crash to the Taiwanese carrier. In fact, CAL
has suffered numerous fatal crashes since its establishment, and it has been rated as one of the most dangerous airlines
in the world (Schultz). Many argued that the carrier's infamous safety record was a direct result of the culture barriers
experienced by its flight crews.
Most people agree that Chinese culture is dramatically different from most other cultures. Many researchers also
believe that these cultural differences are the fundamental cause of the poor safety records in most Asian nations. The
purpose of this research paper is to examine the characteristics of Chinese culture and its relationship with aviation
human factors (AHF). This paper will also examine the possibility of adapting the concept of Crew Resource
Management (CRM) to improve flight safety.
HISTORY OF CHINA AIRLINES

CAL was founded by 26 ex-Taiwanese Air Force Pilots
in 1959. Although registered as a civilian commercial
carrier, CAL was, in feet, a covert joint project between the
Taiwanese Government and the United States' Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The flight crews for CAL were
all military aviators, and the carrier's primary mission was
to conduct high-risk covert flights into Southeast Asia (Liu
1993).
After the conclusion of the Vietnam War, CAL became
Taiwan's flag carrier. However, the airline is still operated
by the government and dominated by Taiwanese Air Force
personnel. Unlike most privately owned airlines, CAL does
not emphasize flight safety and CRM. As a result, the
carrier has experienced numerous safety problems. The
troubled carrier has suffered six major accidents involving
699 fatalities within the past decade (Sogame, Ladkin).
Many AHF researchers have argued that the primary reason
for CAL's poor safety record is a direct result of culture
conflicts (Jing, Lu, and Peng).
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINES CULTURE

It is critical for one to understand certain characteristics
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of Chinese culture before examining its effects on flight
safety. This section of the paper will attempt to briefly
introduce several characteristics of the Chinese culture.
Individualism

One of the most fundamental differences between
non-Chinese and Chinese cultures is the idea of
individualism. Most nations encourage the development of
individualism, and one is rewarded for expressing his/her
own opinion. However, individualism is strongly
discouraged in the Chinese society. This practice is
strongly rooted within the culture. Chinese children are
taught at a young age to listen and not speak, and speak
when only spoken to. This practice is evident in a
popular Chinese saying "God provided us with two ears
and only one mouth because we should listen more and
speak less." This belief resulted in the development of
collective thinking. Chinese will seldom express his/her own
opinion during social settings such as conferences,
lectures, and even intra-cockpit communications.
Social Pressure

Unlike non-Chinese culture, Chinese culture is a shame
culture. Chinese grow up sensitive to pressure from the
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society instead of their internal feelings. Many cultures
emphasize honor systems or codes of honor. These
measurements are often solely based on one's internal
feelings of guilt, and rely heavily on one's own judgments.
Such a system could not be implemented in Chinese
culture, since most Chinese believe in social pressure, and
it is often society that determines one's belief system. As a
result, it is a common practice for Chinese to cut corners,
since it is widely accepted practice by the society. In fact,
those who cut corners are often rewarded for increased
efficiency.
This cultural characteristic can have serious results.
According to a study conducted by the Taiwanese Naval
Academy, people in Chinese society could easily break
rules, operating procedures, and even the code of law when
it is acceptable to society. Due to the same social pressure,
Chinese would view such behaviors as righteous and even
encourage it (Lu, Chang, Wang, Yang, Hao,Li, et al).
Authoritarianism

Chinese culture is based on 5000 years of dictatorships.
As a result, authoritarianism has an important role in the
society (Jing et al). Figures of authority, such as professors,
managers, and airline captains are treated with a great
amount of respect from their subordinates. Unlike cultures
where this relationship only exists in the working
environment, Chinese subordinates treat their superiors
with respect regardless of environments and conditions.
This relationship between superior and subordinate may be
seen during daily interactions. In Chinese society, eye
contact with a figure of authority is considered
disrespectful, and as thus, is strongly discouraged.
It is also a common belief that a figure of authority is
error free. Thus, it is considered an outrage when a Chinese
subordinate challenges a figure of authority. A figure of
authority will not allow such a challenge, nor would they
admit their errors. This is because of the fear of losing face.
The term "face" in Chinese signifies one's dignity and
prestige (Crossing the culture). It is often the subordinate's
responsibility to mainftiin the superior's face, and thus
maintain the harmony of the group.
CHINESE CULTURE IN THE COCKPIT

It is clear that there are significant cultural differences
between Chinese and Western societies. Certain
characteristics within the Chinese culture could prove to be
potentially hazardous in the field of aviation. The following
pan of this paper will examine the Chinese cultural
influences in the cockpit.
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As a result of the Nagoya tragedy, the official Japanese
investigation report recommended C AL ensure that Cockpit
Resource Management is performed most effectively when
the CAP (captain) has the F/O (first officer) performing the
PF (pilot flying) tasks (Sogame, Ladkin). However,
according to the previous analysis of Chinese culture, one
can easily realize the challenges in compliance with these
recommendations.
Chinese culture is not only deeply rooted in the society,
but it also influences Chinese cockpit crews. Captains are
often viewed by Chinese as figures of authority, thus,
Chinese captains are seldom challenged by their first
officers during flight operations even if they have
committed serious safety violations. One of the best
examples of this practice is an accident which occurred on
November 4,1993 when a CAL 747-400 landed long into
Hong Kong's Victoria Bay after its final approach to Hong
Kong's Tai Kai International Airport. According to the
post accident interview, the first officer was well aware of
the fact that his captain (pilot flying) was approaching the
runway with excess airspeed, and the aircraft would not be
able to stop on the runway. However, in an attempt to save
the captain's face and fearing to challenge the figure of
authority, the first officer did not caution the captain
regarding the imminent danger. This ultimately resulted in
the accident (Crossing the culture). The influence of
authoritarianism was further noted when CAL dismissed
the first officer while the carrier filed only a punitive letter
against the captain.
The effects of social pressure are also noticeable
between CAL's cockpit crews. It is a common practice for
certain CAL captains to conduct flight operations with a set
of written procedures. These so called "cheat sheets" are
sets of procedures, mostly radio communications dialogs
with air traffic controllers. These cheat sheets provide
captains precise dialog during each specific portion of
flights, (e.g. if the cheat sheet instructs the captain to report
airport in sight 10 miles from the destination airport. The
captain would make such report regardless of weather
conditions.) It is obvious that most of these procedures are
not approved or allowed by CAL's operation manual.
However, since such practice is widely used by most
captains within the carrier, it is socially acceptable by
others. Due to such social pressure, although prohibited,
such practice is widely spread between CAL's captains, and
even encouraged.
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OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Chinese CRM Programs

It is clear that Chinese culture could potentially create
breakdowns in crew communications and create hazardous
situations. As part of the aftermath of the Nagoya accident,
CAL has devoted tremendous efforts to introduce and
educate its pilots with modern CRM concepts. The carrier
introduced a new CRM program from Lufthansa, one of
Europe's safest commercial carriers. All pilots underwent
courses and Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) using
the new CRM techniques. Although all flight crews were
introduced to this new concept, it was no match for the
deeply embedded culture within the pilots. The carrier
suffered another fatal accident in 1998 when an Airbus
300-622R crashed while approaching Taipei International
Airport. The airliner stalled at an altitude of 1200 feet, and
all 182 onboard and 20 people on the ground were killed.
It was later determined that some of the contributing causes
of this tragedy included a breakdown in crew
communication, and the crews' deviation from standard
operation procedures. This tragedy proved that there were
obvious difficulties for Chinese crewmembers in adopting
and applying Western CRM concepts.
The concept of CRM has been viewed by many as the
solution for increasing flight safety since its introduction in
the 1970s. Fourth generation CRM programs emphasize
concepts such as automation, fatigue, and cabin/cockpit
crew coordination (Maurino). According to Maurino, it is
a common belief by many airline managers that CRM is a
"culturally free" concept. Many believed that a well
developed CRM program could be easily transferred
between different cultures. This belief is shared by many
airline managers within Asian nations, thus, many Asian
carriers, such as China Airlines, still educate their pilots by
utilizing Western CRM programs. Although exposed to
these advanced CRM concepts, many Asian pilots have
difficulty in adopting and applying these approaches in an
Asian cockpit, thus most of these CRM programs have very
limited success within Asian carriers. It is clear that
currently, only a culturally sensitive CRM program could
be effective in increasing crew communication and
improving flight safety.
Many AHF experts believe that the introduction of a
new generation of CRM could successfully resolve the
cultural conflicts faced by today's programs. According to
Helmreich and Wilhelm (2002), the fifth generation CRM
concept could serve as a universal approach to enhance
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flight safety and crew coordination. The primary
characteristic of this new approach is its focus on human
error management instead of human error avoidance. Since
the concepts of human error are universal, this approach
could be adopted in different cultures. It is clear that the
development of human error avoidance is culture specific
since each culture has a unique approach towards human
error and conflict resolution. However, since the new CRM
concepts emphasize management of human errors, it is less
culturally sensitive and therefore may be applied
universally to different cultures.
This writer believes that it is critical for CAL to develop
its own culturally sensitive CRM program utilizing
concepts from both fourth and fifth generation CRM
programs. It is clear that only a program developed for the
Chinese culture would be most effective and acceptable for
flight crews in CAL. Such a program should be developed
by conducting combinations of line audits and crew
interviews. It is critical to utilize a third party to work with
CAL's AHF experts to design and conduct this program.
Crew resistance could be expected during the initial stages
of the development process. However, this writer believes
the long term benefit of such a CRM program could easily
outweigh the temporary inconveniences.
Incident Reporting System

In Taiwan, accidents are often one of the few sources for
improvement in flight safety. Although accident
investigation is a critical aspect of flight safety, preventing
accidents from occurring should be the primary objective of
flight safety. Aviation accidents are often the result of a
series of operational errors. Thus, flight safely can be
dramatically enhanced if the trend of operating errors could
be identified and corrected prior to the circumstances which
result in an accident. Incident investigations often provide
safety experts with the trend of operating errors prior to the
occurrence of an accident. According to Baker, incident
investigations often create better accident prevention results
than accident investigations.
One of the greatest challenges faced by Taiwanese
aviation authorities and air carriers is the lack of
appropriate systems for flight crews to report operation
deviations and pilot errors. Although the Taiwanese
aircrew confidential reporting program has been in effect
since 1999, it has suffered from limited funding and low
participation. It is common for a Chinese figure of
authority, such as a captain, to deny any errors or wrong
doing, thus, it is crucial to educate all line pilots the correct
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mental models of human errors. Using concepts from the
fifth generation CRM, crews must realize that occurrences
of human error are often part of the flight operation. Thus,
one should learn to manage and report such errors instead
of concealing them. The Taiwanese incident self-reporting
program would only be successful with cooperation from its
participating flight crews. Pilot Training Process
The other contributing factor to CAL's poor safety
record is its pilot selection and training process. Unlike
most nations, general aviation does not exist in Taiwan,
thus airlines can only select its pilots from the military or
conduct its own ab initio training programs. As a result,
military aviators have long been the primary candidates for
CAL's pilot selection programs. These aviators are
experienced, well trained, and easily adapt to operating an
airliner. It is also clear to CAL's managers that utilizing
these air force pilots will reduce training costs dramatically.
Thus, the majority of CAL pilots are retired military
aviators.
Although military pilots require minimum training,
many of these candidates also lack the mental model of an
air transport pilot. Due to the constant threats from
communist China, Taiwanese armed forces emphasize the
development of tactical skills and the ability to accomplish
combat missions. Thus the Taiwanese military trains its
pilots to accomplish their missions at all costs. As a result,
flight safety has often been disregarded in the military
community. One of the examples of such practice is the
go-around syndrome. It is common for the military aviators
to reject go-around during a bad approach. Since they
perceive a go-around signifies the lack of skills and failure,
most Taiwanese aviators would attempt to conduct landings
under hazardous conditions. If a successful landing were
accomplished under hazardous conditions, it often viewed
by others as a demonstration of excellent airmanship. There
are few doubts that this practice is an unsafe act, ignoring
all safety regulations, however, since safety is not the
primary concern of the military, such acts are socially
accepted and pilots are even encouraged to perform these
hazardous operations. Sadly, many military pilots maintain
the same attitude while serving the traveling public. In fact,
the 1998 Taipei's tragedy was partly caused by the crews'
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refusal of go-around on an unstable approach.
This writer believes the solution for this problem lies in the
selection methods for Taiwanese pilots. It is clear that the
military established its training methods and criterion from
necessity. However, without an appropriate transition
training, these military aviators are potential hazards
within the civilian aviation industry. Civilian carriers
should establish clear standards and aptitude tests during
pilot selection process, and reduce its reliance on military
pilots. This writer believes that the most effective solution
to such problem is to establish airline flight training
academies. There are few doubts that tactical flying is very
different compared to passenger transports. The military
often bases its selection of pilots upon one's aggressiveness
and ability to work under highly stressful combat situations. It
is obvious that civilian air carriers do not require all the
characteristics of a military pilot. Air carriers could easily
select appropriate applicants for air carrier operations with
an established flight training institution. Carriers could also
introduce concepts such as CRM and proper flight
procedures during initial stages of flight training. This
writer believes that a rigorous selection process, and proper
comprehensive flight training could dramatically improved
flight safety for Taiwanese airlines. CONCLUSION
Overall, it is clear that the Chinese culture plays a
significant role in CRM and flight safety. However, these
cultural characteristics have often been overlooked by most
Taiwanese authorities. As a result, the majority of
Taiwanese flight crews are experiencing difficulties in
utilizing modern CRM concepts within a Chinese culture
oriented cockpit. These deficiencies often result in
deviations from operating procedures, breakdowns in crew
communication, and fatal accidents. This paper has
identified several unique characteristics within the Chinese
culture and their effects in today's multi-crew cockpit.
There are few doubts that certain cultural practices could
become potential hazards in flight operations. However,
this writer believes that the key to resolving these concerns
is to develop proper training procedures adopting these
cultural traits. Only a proper training program designed to
incorporate the unique cultural traits can be successful and
accepted by Chinese crewmembers.*
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